Economics focus:Rate of decline 
　　IN AMERICA retail banking is still a local business. Around 95% of the country’s deposit�瞭akers are “community” banks, estimates those institutions’ trade body; and more than 90% have assets of less than $1 billion, according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), a regulator. Even Bank of America, which comes closest to having a national network, has branches in only 29 of the 50 states. Nevertheless, banking is much less local than it used to be. Advances in technology have made it far easier to offer banking services regionally or nationally. And deregulation has swept away restrictions that once prevented banks from extending their branch networks across state boundaries (even, in some states, within them). Thanks mainly to a wave of mergers, but also to a spate of bank failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the number of banks in America has fallen by half in the past 20 years.
　　Big banks have some obvious advantages over small ones. They can raise money more cheaply than smaller banks, notably in the financial markets, and can therefore offer keener lending rates. Their assets are more diversified and therefore less risky when taken as a group. They may be able to supply a broader range of services for which fees can be charged.
　　That said, the small fry are not helpless when bigger fish swim into their pool. Precisely because of big banks’ easier access to financial markets, they rely less on deposits for their funding. There is evidence that they offer customers meaner deposit rates—and hence make local banks’ life easier in this respect. They also tend to offer all savers the same rate, at least within one state, whereas local banks react more nimbly to local economic conditions. Research also suggests that multi�瞞arket banks charge higher fees than local banks do. And diseconomies as well as economies of scale can come into play. Frequently, merging banks lose some deposits, as customers disgruntled by a big, impersonal institution take their money elsewhere—sometimes to one of the 100-odd new banks set up in America each year.
　　In a forthcoming paper，Allen Berger, of the Federal Reserve, Astrid Dick, of the New York Fed, the late Lawrence Goldberg, of the University of Miami, and Lawrence White, of New York University’s Stern School of Business, weigh two hypotheses about banking mergers. On the one hand, consolidation may have been born of efficiency, as technological progress improved the profitability of large institutions serving several markets faster than that of small, local banks. On the other, mergers may have been the children of hubris, as chief executives sought scale for its own sake. Efficiency�瞓ased mergers should have made life harder for small, single�瞞arket banks; hubris should have helped them.
　　The authors compare the profitability of small banks operating in only one local market in two periods, 1982-1990 and 1991-2000. They find that in the first period, competition from out of town did them more good than harm; their returns on equity were higher if they were up against banks that were big, served many markets or both. In the second period, though, the effect was reversed. In other words, between the 1980s and 1990s bank consolidation became less hubristic and more efficient, to the detriment of small, local banks—thanks, say the authors, largely to developments in technology.
　　It appears that local banks suffered both lost revenues, as the interlopers stole their fees and interest on loans, and also higher costs, as they offered higher deposit rates or spent more on advertising or service to keep hold of their customers. Looking at an alternative measure of local banks’ profitability, the authors suggest that their competitors became sharper at serving several markets, rather than exploiting sheer scale.
　　考研詞匯：
　　extend[ikˈstend]
　　v.延長，延伸
　　[真題例句] In Australia—where an aging population, life-extending technology and changing community attitudes have all played their part—other states are going to consider making a similar law to deal with euthanasia.[1997年閱讀1]
　　[例句精譯] 在澳大利亞，人口老齡化、延長壽命技術和公眾態(tài)度的變化都發(fā)揮著各自的作用，其他州也將考慮制定類似的法律來處理安樂死問題。
　　keen[ki:n]
　　a.①鋒利的;②敏銳的;③敏捷的;④(on)熱心的，渴望的

　　[真題例句] Being too keen (④) to win can have dangerous consequences: remember that Pheidippides, the first marathon runner, dropped dead seconds after saying: “Rejoice, we conquer!”[1995年閱讀4] 
　　[例句精譯] 過分地熱衷于獲勝會產(chǎn)生危險的后果：記住，第一位跑馬拉松的費迪皮迪茲在說完“歡呼吧，我們贏了”之后幾秒就倒地而死。 
　　accessible[əkˈsesəbəl] 
　　a.易接近的，可到達的 
　　[真題例句] As the interaction between organism and environment has come to be understood, however, effects once assigned to states of mind, feelings, and traits are beginning to be traced to accessible conditions, and a technology of behavior may therefore become available.[2002年翻譯] 
　　[例句精譯] 然而，隨著人們開始逐漸了解有機體和環(huán)境之間的相互作用，以前曾被認為是影響因素的心態(tài)、情感及其特征開始從可利用的條件去追求其來源，因此，它有可能成為一種研究行為的技術手段。 
　　executive[igˈzekjutiv] 
　　n.總經(jīng)理，董事，行政負責人;a.執(zhí)行的，實施的 
　　[真題例句] “Is this what you intended to accomplish with your careers?” Senator Robert Dole asked Time Warner executives (n.) last week.[1997年閱讀4] 
　　[例句精譯] 參議員羅伯特·多爾上星期質(zhì)問時代華納公司高級人員時說：“難道這就是你們要成就的事業(yè)嗎?” 
　　[真題例句] Almost immediately word flashed on the Internet and was picked up, half a world away, by John Hofsess, executive (a.) director of the Right to Die Society of Canada.[1997年閱讀1] 
　　[例句精譯] 幾乎同時，該消息就出現(xiàn)在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上，身處地球另一端的加拿大死亡權(quán)利執(zhí)行主席約翰·霍夫塞斯收到了該消息。 
　　reverse[ riˈvə:s] 
　　n.①相反，反轉(zhuǎn)，顛倒;②背面，后面;a.相反的，倒轉(zhuǎn)的;v.顛倒，倒轉(zhuǎn)，(使)倒退 
　　[真題例句] Anyone can see this trend is unsustainable.Yet few seem willing to try to reverse (v.) it.[2003年閱讀4] 
　　[例句精譯] 任何人都明白這個趨勢不能維持下去，但是很少有人愿意扭轉(zhuǎn)它。 
　　scale[skeil] 
　　n.①刻度，標度;②天平，磅秤;③比例尺;④規(guī)模;⑤音階;⑥魚鱗 
　　[真題例句] (50) In dealing with a challenge on such a scale (④), it is no exaggeration to say, “United we stand, divided we fall”—and if I had to choose a slogan it would be “Unity in our diversity.” [2005年翻譯] 
　　[例句精譯] (50)在應對如此規(guī)模的挑戰(zhàn)時，可以毫不夸張地說，“聯(lián)合，我們就生存;分裂，我們就死亡�！比羰亲屛疫x擇一個口號，這就是：求同存異。 
　　背景常識介紹： 
　　美國社區(qū)銀行的起源可以追溯到殖民時代，是由移民社區(qū)中的商人或農(nóng)民建立起來的。在南北戰(zhàn)爭后到 20 世紀 20 年代的中西部開發(fā)熱中，社區(qū)銀行得到迅速發(fā)展，總數(shù)由 3000 家急劇增加到了3萬家左右。在其后的工業(yè)化和城市化進程中，雖然隨著大銀行的發(fā)展和擴張，社區(qū)銀行的數(shù)量逐漸減少，但它始終是美國銀行業(yè)的重要組成部分。 
　　參考譯文： 
　　經(jīng)濟觀察：快速衰退的地方銀行 
　　在美國，零售銀行業(yè)仍局限于本地化經(jīng)營。根據(jù)銀行業(yè)組織的估計，美國95%左右的儲蓄被“社區(qū)”銀行所吸收;監(jiān)管機構(gòu)聯(lián)邦存托擔保集團(FDIC)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，超過90%的銀行注冊資本低于10億美元。美國銀行(Bank of America)的經(jīng)營網(wǎng)絡在同業(yè)中比較接近全國化，也只在全國的50個州中的29個有分支機構(gòu)。但與過去相比，銀行業(yè)的本地化程度已經(jīng)大為降低。技術進步使銀行提供地區(qū)性或全國性的服務比以前簡單得多。另外，國家對金融業(yè)的放松管制掃除了曾經(jīng)阻礙銀行進行跨州擴張的限制(甚至某些州內(nèi)的擴張)。在過去20年內(nèi)，美國銀行數(shù)目已劇減一半，其中合并的浪潮起主要作用，80年代末到90年代初一大批銀行的接連破產(chǎn)也是另一個重要原因。 
　　大銀行相對小銀行有若干明顯優(yōu)勢。他們能更低成本的籌集款項，尤其是在金融市場，因而能提供更低的貸款利率。他們的資產(chǎn)更多元化，因此作為一個整體能顯著降低風險。此外，他們能提供范圍更廣泛的收費性服務。 
　　話雖如此，大魚來了，小魚未必就只能坐以待斃。正因為大銀行能更容易地進入金融市場，有更廣泛的資金來源，他們對儲蓄存款的依賴性較低。跡象顯示大銀行提供給客戶的儲蓄利率比較低——這樣一來，給了本地銀行一定的生存空間。同時，他們傾向于向所有儲蓄者提供相同的利率，至少在同一個州內(nèi);而地方銀行對本地的經(jīng)濟環(huán)境反應更靈敏。研究也指出市場多樣化的銀行比本地銀行收取較高的費用，而且規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟和規(guī)模經(jīng)濟都會反映在收費水平上。合并后的銀行經(jīng)常失去部分存款，因為客戶不滿于他們的存款被龐大的非個人的機構(gòu)拿到別的地方——通常是每年100多家新設立的銀行。 
　　一篇即將發(fā)表的論文(作者是聯(lián)邦儲備局的Allen Berger，紐約聯(lián)邦儲備銀行的Astrid Dick，邁阿密大學已故的Lawrence Glodberg和紐約大學斯特恩商學院的Lawrence White)權(quán)衡了兩個關于銀行合并的假說。一方面，合并因效率而生，因為技術進步對盈利能力的提升作用，在服務多個市場的大機構(gòu)比小的地方銀行來得更快。另一方面，合并會滋生傲慢情緒，因為公司高層會為了自身的利益而盲目追求規(guī)模。高效率的合并會使市場單一的小銀行更難生存;大銀行的傲慢反而有利于他們。 
　　這四位作者對1982-1990 和1991-2000兩個時期內(nèi)只在單一市場經(jīng)營的小銀行的盈利能力進行了對比。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)在前一時期，外來的競爭利大于弊;如果對手是服務多個市場的大銀行，小銀行的股票收益就會增加。在第二個時期，競爭卻起相反的作用。換言之，從80年代到90年代，技術的進步使銀行的合并變得越來越理性和高效，從而對小的地方銀行產(chǎn)生損害。 
　　可見地方銀行不但由于外來銀行搶占貸款利息和服務費用而導致總收入減少，而且由于提供較高的儲蓄利率以及在廣告和服務上的花費而承擔更高的成本。作者從另外一個角度來看待本地銀行的盈利能力，并指出大銀行在提供多個市場服務方面越發(fā)得心應手，但在服務的深度上卻有待加強。